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READING THE SHIBBOLETH: DERRIDA – DE MAN – ROUSSEAU
Stefan ESPOSITO1
ABSTRACT ▪ : This essay performs an original reading of  Jacques Derrida’s 
“Acts,” a memorial written for Paul de Man that endeavors to answer the 
question, “What is the legacy of  deconstruction?” with reference to the 
question of  deconstruction as a type of  community, and also with reference 
to the repercussions of  deconstruction for our understanding of  the limits 
of  community (the problem of  the shibboleth). Focusing on an interruption 
in “Acts” that concerns the “Rhetoric of  Blindness” debate between Derrida 
and de Man over whether or not Rousseau should be read as a member of  
the community of  deconstruction avant la lettre, the present essay argues against 
past evaluations of  the debate that portray it in terms of  simple antagonism. 
As Derrida makes clear in “Acts” the debate over whether or not Rousseau 
utters a certain type of  shibboleth, and whether or not any text or speech 
act can off er a shibboleth concerning its self-conscious use of  always already 
indeterminate language, aptly distills the problem of  the limits of  community 
and the conditions of  possibility for community, a problem that must necessarily 
be thought through in any discussion of  the legacy of  deconstruction.
KEYWORDS ▪ : Deconstruction. Community. Shibboleth. Rousseau. Rhetoric.
Prologue
The title of  this study posits the existence of  a community, albeit a small one: 
three names, three ﬁ gures, three intertwined stories. These ﬁ gures are invoked, 
each name interrupted by the next, in order to read through the implications of  a 
problematic question posed some 23 years ago by Jacques Derrida in his Mémoires: for 
Paul de Man: What will be the legacy of  deconstruction? 
Derrida’s text off ers no easy answers, and nothing resembling a systematic plan 
for the future. However, read carefully, the ﬁ nal chapter of  Derrida’s attempt at 
“mourning the death of  a friend,” entitled “Acts,” appears as more allegory than 
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eulogy. Although Derrida (1986a, p.1) begins Mémoires with the confession, “I have 
never known how to tell a story,” “Acts” is decidedly the story of  a community, and 
of  the relationship between deconstruction and the question of  community itself.
For Derrida, writing in 1984, the death of  Paul de Man threatens the future 
existence of  “deconstruction in America,” a community whose limits – despite 
having then existed for almost 20 years – are anything but clear. With Derrida’s 
recent death, emphasis returns to the question subtending his memorial address: 
W(h)ither “deconstruction in America”?2 Many a recent article has hinged upon the 
presence or absence of  that unvoiced ‘h.’ 
Critics attempting to deﬁ ne the “whither” rather than the “wither,” have 
frequently found themselves drawn to consider the applicability of  deconstruction 
to the question of  community. From the strange (all-too-operable) community that 
is the 21st century corporate boardroom, to the amorphous, globalized connections 
that increasingly problematize organic conceptions of  community: deconstruction 
often has something insightful to off er. And these insights have been anything but 
univocal. Often they occur at the intersection of  deconstruction and Marxism 
(Pheng Cheah’s “spectral nationality,” or Hardt and Negri’s “multitude,”) or at the 
intersection of  deconstruction and theology (Agamben’s quasi-utopian “whatever” 
[qualunque]). Indeed, it could be said that the best work performed by deconstruction 
in recent years has been in dialogue with the question of  community. However, those 
on the side of  “wither,” have repeatedly voiced concerns as to whether the persistent 
“nihilism” of  deconstruction prevents any genuine or constructive mobilization of  
any movement, group, or affi  liation, let alone something that can genuinely be called 
community.
Rather than debate the respective merits of  these claims and end up declaring 
deconstruction dead, barely breathing, or hale, the present study will evaluate the 
legacy of  deconstruction as a question of  community on Derrida’s own terms. 
Looking closely into “Acts,” we will soon ﬁ nd – as Derrida ﬁ nds – that this entails 
accounting for Rousseau’s role in the history of  deconstruction. But, why Rousseau? 
Why not Heidegger, Nietzsche, or Mallarmé? At ﬁ rst glance this other trio is more 
exemplary of  and for deconstruction than Rousseau. But this is precisely the issue at 
hand. Those others are easily assimilated into deconstruction as a community, into 
the idea of  deconstruction as a group of  subjects. But, Rousseau is troublesome. 
Derrida wants him out. De Man wants him in. As such, Rousseau raises for 
2 The steady levels of critical interest in Gilles Deleuze, and the booming American prestige of Giorgio 
Agamben, Alain Badiou, and Jacques Rancière would seem to have rendered the “death of theory” discourse 
moot. The “death of theory” argument has always only been an attempt to dispose of the troublesome 
corpus of “deconstruction.” See, as instances: Critical Inquiry (2004); Mehlman (2007); Boyd (2006) and 
Patai and Corral (2005). 
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deconstruction the problem implicit in every community, the problem of  the limits 
of  community, and how these limits can be marked in language. This is an old and 
persistent problem. In the Hebrew bible it takes the form of  the problem of  the 
shibboleth: 
And the Gileadites took the passages of  Jordan before the Ephraimites: and it 
was so, that when those Ephraimites which were escaped said, Let me go over; 
that the men of  Gilead said unto him, Art thou an Ephraimite? If  he said, 
Nay; Then said they unto him, Say now Shibboleth: and he said Sibboleth: for 
he could not frame to pronounce it right. Then they took him, and slew him 
at the passages of  Jordan: and there fell at that time of  the Ephraimites forty 
and two thousand3.
How can we “frame to pronounce” the question of  the future of  deconstruction 
“right”? How do we account for the history (past, present, or future) of  a movement, 
community, or school of  thought whose core principles problematize any attempt at 
accounting? If  we wish to speak of  the future of  this community, can we correctly 
pronounce its terms, and achieve what Derrida (1986b, p.322) calls, in an article on 
Paul Celan entitled “Shibboleth,” the “legitimate habitation of  a language”?4. Or will 
we be cut down before the passages we wish to read? 
These three questions ultimately reduce to one: How do we begin to tell the story 
of  the future of  a community? Whether or not it is a question of  deconstruction, the 
question of  community must, Derrida warns, begin with Rousseau and the problem 
posed by beginning to read Rousseau. So then, ‘S(h)ibboleth,’ and into the passages: 
“Abandon hope all ye who enter”5.
“Rousseau”, Derrida (1986a, p.125) writes in “Acts,” “is not one proper name 
among others in de Manian deconstruction”. Rousseau, for de Man, is the proper 
name. His texts, like de Man’s own, signify with an awareness that, as de Man claims 
in Allegories of  Reading, “unmediated expression is a philosophical impossibility” 
(DE MAN, 1983, p.9)6. Accordingly, de Man privileges Rousseau as a radical case, 
3 Judges 12: 5-6, King James translation.
4 Many of the issues raised in “Acts” are also taken up by Derrida’s “Shibboleth” essay, and one could 
approach the same questions through that text. As I am principally interested in the debate between de 
Man and Derrida, and the threat it poses to “deconstruction,” “Acts” seems the more appropriate point of 
entry. 
5 Lasciate ogni speranza voi ch’entrate, Dante’s Inferno, Canto III, line 9.
6 Percy Shelley and Friedrich Hölderlin also occasionally appear as exemplary “non-blinded” authors in 
de Man’s oeuvre, but even here, Rousseau lurks in the background, cf. De Man (1984a, 1984b).
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a radical exception in his collection of  essays Blindness and Insight. “Rousseau’s text 
has no blind spots,” de Man (1983, p.139, emphases added) claims, “it accounts at 
all moments for its own rhetorical mode”. This capacity for self-reﬂ ection, for a 
textual profession de soi, cements Rousseau’s exemplarity for de Man’s critical project; 
Rousseau is the ﬁ gure(r) par excellence of  the inexorably ﬁ gural nature of  language. 
De Man even cites Rousseau as a point of  origin. This origin is an aporia, a 
roadblock hindering “progress,” but an origin nonetheless. The introduction to 
Allegories of  Reading explains: 
Allegories of  Reading started out as a historical study and ended up as a theory 
of  reading. I began to read Rousseau seriously in preparation for a historical 
reﬂ ection on Romanticism and found myself  unable to progress beyond local 
diffi  culties of  interpretation. In trying to cope with this, I had to shift from 
historical deﬁ nition to the problematics of  reading. (DE MAN, 1979, p.xi)7.
The “local diffi  culties of  interpretation” presented by “read[ing] Rousseau 
seriously” lead de Man to develop a theory regarding the general diffi  culties of  
interpretation presented by any reading. Beginning to read Rousseau seriously is the 
origin of  de Manian deconstruction.
Of  course, a phrase as paradoxical as “the origin of  (de Manian) deconstruction” 
must account for itself. To blatantly assert an origin for a category or name 
(deconstruction) that deﬁ nes itself  with reference to the impossibility of  origins…
such a statement must be ironic. Mustn’t it? But, if  we take this rhetorical question 
seriously, the problem expands. One question divides into three:
1) Can the present text, or any other, make a reﬂ exive gesture towards its 
own irony or rhetoricity? 
2) Can a text fail to be self-reﬂ exive? 
3) Can rhetoric account for rhetoric? 
Any extended interrogation of  these questions would doubtlessly reach another 
aporia. But we mustn’t lose hope. According to Derrida’s “Acts,” this apparent 
roadblock is in fact the condition upon which deconstruction, and reading itself  
7 De Man’s ostensive “shift from historical defi nition to the problematics of reading” is, of course, a 
rhetorical origin story, much like the historical investigation of the symbol in “The Rhetoric of Temporality.” 
The authoritative text on de Man’s ironical appropriations of historical and temporal terminology is Carol 
Jacobs, “Allegories of Reading Paul de Man,” in Reading de Man Reading. Here, Jacobs (1989, p.117) 
writes: “[...] as de Man’s irony becomes increasingly conscious of itself, it demonstrates the impossibility 
of being historical. It rejects its own temporal movement of correcting error to produce (illusory) wisdom 
and recognizes it or rather performs it as a problem that exists within the rhetoric of temporality.”
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are possible. Any consideration of  the legacy, that is to say, the past, present and 
future possibility of  deconstruction, must revolve around the void opened by these 
questions. 
These are precisely the questions that emerge when one attempts to account 
for Rousseau’s position in the history of  deconstruction. Derrida’s memorial grants 
Rousseau a genetic status similar to that accorded him in de Man’s Allegories, though 
here the point of  origin is collective, a site of  shared ﬁ liation:
Rousseau has played a singular role for Paul de Man and me. And from the 
very ﬁ rst day of  our meeting, in Baltimore in 1966, when we had begun with 
this by evoking l’Essai sur l’origine des langues, a text then little read and on which 
we were both in the process of  working. Beginning with this memory, of  
which the only thing that I retain is the memory, of  which the only thing that 
I retain is the name Rousseau, I passed to the following remark: the entire – 
interrupted – history of  de Manian deconstruction passes through Rousseau. 
(DERRIDA, 1986a, p.127 emphasis added).
“Rousseau” begins “this.” He initiates a friendship, the nucleus of  a community that 
will come to be called “deconstruction in America” (DERRIDA, 1986a, p.122). 
Derrida cannot account for the content of  his discussion with de Man. But the 
ﬁ gure “Rousseau” remains embedded in his memory. Even before “it is a question 
of  deconstruction” (DERRIDA, 1986a, p.126), “Rousseau” links de Man and 
Derrida, and begins “this,” a history-to-come.
However “this” is not preﬁ gured by Rousseau alone, but rather by a problem 
posed by beginning with Rousseau. Derrida (1986a, p.128) continues, “Rousseau-
and-Nietzsche, then, and I said to myself  that, curiously, this couple had always 
haunted me, me too, and well before I was in a position to refer to them in public 
works.” Derrida (1986a, p.128) goes on to make his own profession de soi (“…here it 
comes, we are approaching the genre of  ‘memoirs,’ in its worst form’…”) in order 
to recount the shared history connecting him and de Man before they met: “I said 
to myself, then [in 1966] yes, for him it had also been Rousseau and Nietzsche, all 
in all, the two bodies or two parts of  Allegories of  Reading.” (DERRIDA, 1986a, 
p.128). Thus, Derrida and de Man are coupled by the shared signiﬁ cance of  another 
couple (Rousseau and Nietzsche). Two are made one by virtue of  two. But is this 
other couple one (a duality become singular: Rousseau – Nietzsche) or two (a couple 
whose eternal separation may be signiﬁ ed by a disjunctive copula: Rousseau-and-
Nietzsche?). The “entire – interrupted – history” of  “deconstruction in America” 
begins with these questions: Can two bodies, two texts be made “all in all” one? 
From the start, then, “deconstruction in America” emerges out of  a question of  the 
tenability and limits of  community, the question of  the shibboleth. 
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Derrida’s “this” begins with the problem of  the shibboleth, but the shibboleth in 
turn threatens the possibility for “this,” the nucleus, to proliferate into something 
resembling a community. Midway through recounting his “interrupted history of  
deconstruction,” Derrida interrupts himself  with a seemingly tangential digression. 
Derrida is pulled up short by his own story. The problem is this: “Rousseau,” half  of  
the originary odd couple that in turn couples de Man to Derrida is also the source of  
their most fundamental disagreement: 
This is the important essay entitled ‘The Rhetoric of  Blindness,” which 
proposes an original and new reading of  Rousseau, deﬁ nes that concept 
of  the ‘rhetoric of  blindness” which organizes all of  the work in the book 
[Blindness and Insight], and disputes a reading of  Rousseau that I [Derrida] had 
proposed in a recently published book [Of  Grammatology]. (DERRIDA, 1986a, 
p.125). 
This dispute over a reading of  Rousseau, which Richard Klein’s “The Blindness 
of  Hyperbole: The Ellipses of  Insight” calls the “[...] most uncanny, most insane, 
most bizarrely interesting critical encounter imaginable” (KLEIN, 1973, p.34), 
appears as an irruptive event in Derrida’s ﬁ nal memorial lecture8. When read in 
terms of  this interruption, Derrida’s alternately playful and mournful meanderings 
in “Acts” ask us to consider the future of  “deconstruction in America” in terms of  
a debate over whether rhetoric can account for itself. Put bluntly, the history (past, 
present, and future) of  deconstruction as a community hinges upon whether or not 
Rousseau pronounces a shibboleth.
Critical history has not been kind to Paul de Man when it comes to “The 
Rhetoric of  Blindness.” The textual showdown between de Man and Derrida has 
been uniformly decided in Derrida’s favor. Indeed, Derrida’s ﬁ rst explicit, though 
paraleiptic, entry into the debate in “Acts” invokes the proper names of  the critics 
who called the match in his favor: 
I will not enter here into this debate, for many reasons. First of  all, because 
it still remains a bit enigmatic to me. Next, because others, including Paul de 
Man, have themselves returned to this debate and have done so better than 
I could do it here. I again think of  Rodolphe Gasché, Suzanne Gearhart, 
Richard Klein, David Carroll. Finally, and above all, if  there must be a last 
word on this debate, I want it to come from Paul de Man. I can only, from 
8 “The Rhetoric of Blindness” was written for the 1971 edition of Blindness and Insight, and also appears 
in Dialectical Anthropology v.2, n.1 p.1-18, 1977
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now on, speak of  him in the desire to speak for him, in the desire to speak 
with him and ﬁ nally, to leave to him the chance to speak. (DERRIDA, 1986a, 
p.125, emphasis mine).
Although the passage invokes the names Gasché, Klein, Gearhart and Carroll, 
it is also decidedly dismissive. Despite their critical appraisals, the problem remains 
“enigmatic.” Derrida lists those who have responded “better than I could do it here,” 
but immediately shifts the debate back to himself  and de Man. Names are recounted. 
Arguments are not. 
Accordingly we must read the introductory sentence of  this passage, “I will 
not enter here into this debate,” in all its ambivalence. Derrida will not enter this 
debate. He “[...] will not touch directly on this public debate, but speak indirectly 
of  it for a brief  moment in order to make a few private remarks.” The passage is 
literally a tangent: “…memories intersect here...” (DERRIDA, 1986a, p.125-126). 
It touches the public debate and the proper names of  its participants, but suddenly 
veers away. The ﬁ nal account will emerge from an invocation of  this critical debate, 
but will end in a diff erent realm entirely. As Derrida says, “I want it to come from 
Paul de Man.” Put otherwise: the ﬁ nal account will come from beyond the grave 
(read: the ﬁ nal account will never come). The “private remarks” Derrida seeks to 
add are meant, then, to open up an odd space where Derrida’s speech act at once 
becomes de Man’s (“speak of  him in the desire to speak for him”), yet maintains the 
otherness of  de Man’s voice (“in the desire to speak with him”), while also allowing 
de Man’s voice to override his own (“to leave him a chance to speak”). One might 
say that this convoluted speech act seeks to enter (again, or for the ﬁ rst time?) into 
community with de Man. From here on it is no longer Derrida and de Man, but 
Derrida–de Man.
This moment in the middle of  Derrida’s speech is the most important of  the 
lecture. Here, the tacit trajectory of  his remarks in “Acts,” “To speak to you…of  the 
future of  a thought, of  what Paul de Man has bequeathed to us…” (DERRIDA, 
1986a, p.93), comes into unavoidable conﬂ ict with his desire to “not enter here into 
this debate” over Rousseau. Pondering the indebtedness of  de Man‘s thought to 
Rousseau, Nietzsche and Hölderlin, the “three Madmen of  Western Modernity!” 
(DERRIDA, 1986a, p.128), Derrida realizes that the question of  de Man’s legacy, and 
the future of  “deconstruction in America,” are intimately entwined with this debate. 
Derrida writes: 
I daydreamed a bit on this theme of  madness – the ﬁ gure of  de Manian 
thinking as a thinking of  madness, a thinking of  memory or a history of  
Western and modern madness, of  a madness of  America, not in the sense 
that America would be mad but in the sense that it is necessary to think it 
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from the perspective of  mad lucidity, under the light of  lunacy. I daydreamed 
in these realms without knowing where I was going, and without knowing if  I 
ought to go ahead and publish such fragments from a letter; at least this would 
interest friends, readers or students of  de Man and add a public contribution 
to the debate surrounding Rousseau. (DERRIDA, 1986a, p.129). 
This daydream on madness is itself  an instance of  madness. The moment 
of  the daydream, “under the light of  lunacy,” is the moment when Derrida’s prose 
can no longer account for itself. Though he claims he “will not enter here into this 
debate,” namely the “public debate,” the daydream compels him to “add a public 
contribution to the debate surrounding Rousseau.” Is he entering, then, or not? 
And which debate is taking place? The public? The private? In other words, does 
the tangential invocation mentioned above interrupt and separate or interrupt and 
conjoin? Is the debate now public–private, or public-and-private? Does Derrida 
wish for the odd speech act approximating a private colloquy (Derrida–de Man) to 
override the past public debate surrounding Derrida-and-de Man? Hardly. Rather, 
Derrida’s moment of  madness playfully reiterates the main point of  this seemingly 
self-contained interruption in the text; the debate in question existed before “The 
Rhetoric of  Blindness” was subject to public scrutiny. This public debate merely 
dramatizes the foundational question of  deconstruction. 
To underscore this point, Derrida enters the public debate with quotations 
from private correspondence, “fragments from a letter” that predate the public 
showdown. De Man’s voice appears in the middle of  “Acts” as a quotation from 
“[...] a letter dated July 9, 1970, from Zumikon in Switzerland, before the publication 
of  ‘The Rhetoric of  Blindness’”. The fragment is de Man’s reply to a letter Derrida 
(1986a, p.129) wrote “to thank Paul de Man” for “the manuscript” of  “The Rhetoric 
of  Blindness”. In response to Derrida’s thanks, de Man scolds:
The other day was neither the time nor the place to speak again of  Rousseau 
and I do not know if  you have any reason to return to the question. Your 
“supposed” agreement [this is a word I must have written in my letter] can 
only be kindness, for if  you object to what I have to say about metaphor, 
you must, as it should be, object to everything. My essay moves through for 
economic reasons, a whole series of  questions and complications which, in 
my eyes, do not weaken the central proposition. I do not know yet why you 
keep refusing Rousseau the value of  radicality which you attribute to Mallarmé 
and no doubt to Nietzsche; I believe that it is for hermeneutic rather than 
historical reasons, but I am probably wrong. The text will appear in October 
in Poétique in a translation which seems to me faithful. (DERRIDA, 1986a, 
p.129, emphasis mine).
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Even before the article appears in print, de Man foresees the two main terms 
of  the subsequent public debate: Rousseau’s exemplarity/radicality and the theory 
of  metaphor found in his l’Essai sur la origine des langues. When read carefully, however, 
these two problems are really one. They are mere dramatizations of  “the central 
proposition” of  “The Rhetoric of  Blindness”: a central proposition intimately 
connected to the problem of  the shibboleth. 
So then, how does “The Rhetoric of  Blindness” begin this public debate? 
Appropriately, the origins are not so clear-cut. De Man eff ectively begins the debate 
a year before “The Rhetoric of  Blindness” appears, before Derrida receives the 
manuscript that prompts his “thanks.” De Man’s review article on Derrida’s Of  
Grammatology from 1970 sketches out the argument later elaborated by “The Rhetoric 
of  Blindness”:
A critical reading of  Derrida might therefore take two diff erent directions. 
On the one hand, we might reproach him for giving too much weight to 
Rousseau’s “premodernist” texts and passages, for overemphasizing factors 
of  distance, negativity, and historical arbitrariness that must give way before 
the massive affi  rmation of  fulﬁ lled presence, in its immediate or elegiac form, 
found in so many famous pages. We might, in particular, invoke the most 
strictly “poetic” passages of  Rousseau’s oeuvre, precisely in the logocentric 
sense of  the word, which appear in the works Derrida neglects (Julie, Reveries, 
certain passages of  the Confessions). But we might also argue in the opposite 
direction and show that in these very “poetic” texts appears a conception of  
language of  which Derrida’s very account is merely a discursive version. We 
owe a great deal to Jacques Derrida for having imposed on the interpretation 
of  Rousseau the necessity of  making such a choice, and for having designated 
with an exemplary philosophical lucidity the site where this choice must be 
made. (DE MAN, 1989, p.217, emphases mine).
“The Rhetoric of  Blindness” chooses this latter interpretation and “argue[s] in 
the opposite direction.” 
Seizing upon the fact that Rousseau locates the origins of  language in non-
referential metaphor rather than nominalization, de Man (1983, p.136) reads 
what Rousseau “says about representation and metaphor as the cornerstone of  
a theory of  rhetoric”. He goes on to claim that Rousseau presents “a conception 
of  language” in l’Essai sur l’origine des langues of  which de Man and Derrida’s own 
theories are merely “a discursive version.” In de Man’s reading, a conception of  
language as always already rhetorical is precisely Rousseau’s main concern and 
greatest insight: 
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All sequential language is dramatic, narrative language. It is also the language 
of  passion because passion, in Rousseau, is precisely the manifestation of  a 
will that exists independently of  any speciﬁ c meaning or intent and that therefore 
can never be traced back to a cause or origin.” (DE MAN, 1983, p.132, emphasis 
added). 
Rousseau thus deconstructs the very notion of  origin that his text invokes: “It 
[Rousseau’s essay] can only tell this story as a ﬁ ction [invoking the origin of  language 
as it subverts it], knowing that the ﬁ ction will be taken for fact and the fact for 
ﬁ ction; such is the necessarily ambivalent nature of  literary language” (DE MAN, 
1983, p.136). De Man casts Rousseau’s theory of  rhetoric as a shibboleth. As such, 
de Man grants Rousseau the “radicality” that Derrida denies him. For Rousseau’s 
story of  the origin of  language successfully pronounces the “h” that announces him 
as a fellow Gileadite, a “de-bunker of  the arche (or origin)” on par with Derrida, 
Nietzsche or de Man himself  (DE MAN, 1979, p.9). 
De Man’s concomitant critique of  Derrida is this: Derrida does not account 
for the rhetorical nature of  Rousseau’s invocation of  origins. Of  Grammatology 
again and again tries to catch Rousseau red-handed hypostasizing a stable point 
of  originary reference. Derrida presents a history of  logocentrism, “Heidegger’s and 
Nietzsche’s ﬁ ction of  metaphysics as a period in Western thought” (DE MAN, 
1983, p.137, emphases in text) that relies heavily on Rousseau’s theory of  the origin 
of  language to make its point. Derrida presents Rousseau as symptomatic of  this 
logocentric “period,” and even calls it “The Age of  Rousseau.” Why? Because Derrida 
(1974, p.275) believes that even though Rousseau “[…] does not permit himself  
the use of  literal meaning…in spite of  his intention and all appearance to the 
contrary, he also begins…with literal meaning…In a word he restores to the expression 
of  emotions a literalness whose loss he accepts, from the very origin, in the designation 
of  objects [...]”9. Rousseau fails to subvert, challenge, or deconstruct the notion of  
an origin. He merely displaces the origin from the act of  naming an object in the 
world to the literal expression of  an emotional response. In Derrida’s portrayal, 
“Rousseau no longer locates the literal meaning in the referent of  the metaphor as 
an object, but he interiorizes the object and makes the metaphor refer to an inner 
state of  consciousness, a feeling or a passion.” (DE MAN, 1983, p.133). For de Man, 
however, every seemingly literal statement in Rousseau is preemptively ironized by 
his theory of  language as rhetoric. Derrida simply does not recognize or perhaps 
chooses not to hear Rousseau’s shibboleth. 
9 A more thorough investigation of the dynamics of Derrida’s reading of Rousseau is beyond the scope 
of this paper. I cite Of Grammatology sparsely because the issue at hand is not whether Derrida actually 
misreads Rousseau, but how a tacit question of misreading becomes a question of the tenability of 
community in “Acts.”
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We should not, however, read this critique too hastily. For, as de Man (1983, p.138) 
claims: “What happens in Rousseau is exactly what happens in Derrida: a vocabulary 
of  substance and of  presence is no longer used declaratively but rhetorically…”. 
These curious remarks apply equally to de Man’s own text. One ought to read the 
title Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of  Contemporary Criticism as one would 
read the paratext “Symphony no. 9 in D minor.” The argument could be transposed 
into a diff erent key, a diff erent register, a diff erent rhetoric, but then it would not be 
a critique of  contemporary criticism. The terms “blindness” and “insight” embody 
an epistemological model couched in the metaphysics of  presence. But, de Man’s 
text troubles this epistemological model, and the metaphysics on which it is based, 
precisely via a series of  analyses on its own terms. In fact, de Man utters his own 
shibboleth in “The Rhetoric of  Blindness.” He assures us that “critical blindness and 
critical insight” are not accusations of  “semiconscious duplicity” at all, but rather “a 
necessity dictated and controlled by the very nature of  critical language.” (DE MAN, 
1983, p.111). Given this avowal, one must be wary of  taking de Man’s critique of  
Derrida too literally. 
In fact, de Man (1983, p.139) recognizes Derrida’s reading as a rhetorical 
reading. He grants that Derrida too pronounces a shibboleth concerning the ineluctable 
rhetoricity of  language: Derrida’s “[...] chapter on method, on literary interpretation 
as deconstruction, is ﬂ awless in itself  but made to apply to the wrong object.” 
Although Derrida espouses the same theory of  rhetoric as Rousseau, he turns 
against a fellow Gileadite in order to tell his own story of  “a recurrent error in judgment,” 
by which he means the history of  the metaphysics of  presence privileging speech 
over writing (DE MAN, 1983, p.139). Rather than re-telling Rousseau’s story of  
the origins of  language as a story of  “inexorable regression,” Derrida chooses to 
critique Rousseau. As such, Derrida’s “misreading” is inevitable. Merely by virtue 
of  choosing to write in the critical mode, Derrida makes an example of  Rousseau 
instead of  making him exemplary. He has fallen into the trap of  all critical rhetoric 
(the blindness/insight dichotomy). De Man (1983, p.140) clariﬁ es: “Derrida did not 
choose to adopt this pattern: instead of  having Rousseau deconstruct his critics, we 
have Derrida deconstructing a pseudo-Rousseau by means of  insights that could 
have been gained from the ‘real’ Rousseau. The pattern is too interesting not to be 
deliberate.” 
“Deliberate”: Derrida is not blind to what he is doing. Or, at least, none of  
us can see what language does behind our backs. As such, De Man’s critique is less 
directed at Derrida’s deafness to Rousseau’s shibboleth than at the fact that the “less 
mature” Derrida chooses to use “Rousseau as a sparring partner” to prove his point, 
whereas “Rousseau needed no equivalent mediating ﬁ gure […]” (DE MAN, 1983, 
p.140). If  we read de Man’s categories of  “blindness” and “insight” as rhetorical 
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appropriations of  critical rhetoric (i.e. always in the process of  deconstructing 
themselves), his critique collapses the multiple questions of  Rousseau’s theory 
of  metaphor (rhetoric) and Rousseau’s exemplarity into the single, one might say 
singular, question of  the shibboleth. The question of  critical understanding becomes 
a question of  community. In choosing to write his story, Derrida decides to exclude 
Rousseau from the history of  deconstruction: Derrida contra Rousseau. De Man’s 
critique is less concerned with taking Derrida’s reading to task than in scolding him 
for writing Rousseau out when he could just as well be written in. 
However, the participants of  the public debate invoked in “Acts” all choose 
not to read de Man’s categories as rhetorical appropriations of  critical language. 
Carroll, Gearhart and Klein all take de Man literally10. Yet, even as these critics 
approach “The Rhetoric of  Blindness” in a manner diametrically opposed to 
the reading suggested above, each in turn unearths the centrality of  the shibboleth 
concerning the rhetoricity of  language. Seizing upon passages in de Man’s text such 
as “The only literal statement that says what it means to say is the assertion that there 
can be no literal statements” (DE MAN, 1983, p.133), these critics argue that this 
shibboleth is de Man’s criteria for entry into a community that can speak, as it were, 
beyond ‘blindness’ and ‘insight.’ That being the case, Carroll, Klein, and Gearhart 
logically conclude that de Man applies a double standard, a double shibboleth, when it 
comes to Derrida. For unlike Lukács, Poulet and Blanchot whom de Man considers 
blind to the insights of  their own methodologies, de Man (1983, p.139) considers 
Derrida “a somewhat diff erent case”. As Klein (1973, p.40) puts it, de Man “[...] 
acquiesces to every major element of  Derrida’s enterprise; he even acknowledges the 
justice of  Derrida’s reading of  Rousseau. What he wants, however, is to show that 
Derrida has in a certain fashion misrepresented Rousseau’s knowledge – or the text’s 
knowledge – of  its own movement” (emphasis mine). Carroll’s “Representation or 
the End(s) of  History: Dialectic and Fiction” phrases the same concern thus: “In 
his critique of  Derrida’s reading of  Rousseau, de Man posits a theory of  literature 
in which the text is assumed to be totally self-conscious of  itself  at all times, a total 
presence, and to contain the presence of  the ‘real’ author as well…” (CARROLL, 
1980, p.220). Enter Gearhart (1984, p.252): “De Man argues that any theory of  
language whose ﬁ rst premise is that language is metaphorical by deﬁ nition ‘escapes 
10 A literal reading of de Man’s blindness/insight binary is really the only thing that unites these diverse 
texts. Carroll borrows much of his reading of Lukács from de Man, but undertakes to refute “The Rhetoric 
of Blindness” in the space of a footnote. A more developed, but ultimately equivalent version of his critique 
appears in his Paraesthetics: Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida. Klein’s text is characteristically incisive and 
artful. I differ with its conclusions solely insofar as Klein assumes Derrida’s “deconstruction” to be a more 
rigorous and stronger interpretive practice than de Man’s “reading.” Gearhart’s analysis is generally apt. 
However, the extent to which de Man thinks that the logocentric fallacy can be “escaped” is not supported 
beyond her literal reading of his shibboleth. 
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from the logocentric fallacy’”. Finally, back to Klein (1973, p.36): de Man’s categories 
of  “blindness” and “insight” “[...] tend to presuppose the unity of  a perception, 
thereby of  a consciousness endowed with these qualities of  vision”.
Thus, the public debate is decided in Derrida’s favor because de Man’s 
categories break down at the moment “[…] where the force of  Derrida’s text seizes 
upon de Man’s own categories – particularly those of  blindness and insight – and 
whirls them around, puts them through subversions and perversions from which 
they never recover.” (KLEIN, 1973, p.39). These subversions and perversions 
resulting from the potentias of  Derrida’s text expose the mere rhetoricity of  de Man’s 
supposedly literal categories. Put otherwise, when de Man claims that there are 
instances where “…the literary text itself  has areas of  blindness…” and also a “[...] 
more complicated case of  the non-blinded author – as we have claimed Rousseau to 
be…” (DE MAN, 1983 p.141) his categories imply a referential displacement similar 
to that which Derrida ﬁ nds in Rousseau. Where Rousseau literalizes emotions, de 
Man literalizes consciousness. And, indeed one can read the whole second half  of  
Allegories of  Reading, where de Man systematically reads through Rousseau’s most 
famous works, as a response to critics who dismissed his critique of  Derrida for 
relying on a phenomenological account of  textual consciousness. 
The stakes can be summed up thusly: de Man’s text seemingly demands that 
other texts pronounce a shibboleth that it itself  does not pronounce. De Man valorizes 
Rousseau for pronouncing this shibboleth. He even grants that Derrida pronounces 
the same shibboleth. Yet, the public debate insists that his categories of  “blindness” 
and “insight” fail to obey the same law. They fail to pronounce a shibboleth signifying 
their own ﬁ ctionality. De Man’s shibboleth cuts itself  down by demanding a literal 
statement regarding the impossibility of  literal language. 
Despite de Man’s explicit caveat that I cited above, does he in fact fail to mark 
off  the strategic ﬁ ctionality of  his own categories? Again, this question splits off  into 
variants of  the three questions that imposed themselves at the beginning of  this 
study: 
1) How does a text mark itself ? 
2) How does language speak itself ? 
3) Can rhetoric mark itself  as rhetoric? 
We might be inclined, at this point, to invoke these questions rhetorically as 
a critique of  de Man. One might even say that this is the substance of  Derrida’s 
veiled critique in “Acts,” a critique that approximates a “ﬁ nal word” on the debate. 
His convoluted, polyphonic invocation of  de Man’s presence amounts to a “public 
contribution to the debate surrounding Rousseau” because it dramatizes the 
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impossibility of  any speech act that “accounts at all moments” for itself. If  we cannot 
tell who is speaking in the context of  this memorial, how can we ever be sure that a 
speech act “knows and marks” itself ? One need only look to Derrida’s “Signature, 
Event, Context” (to cite only one of  many possible exemplary texts) to assert that, 
for Derrida, the “speech act that accounts at all moments for its own rhetorical 
mode” is always already unsaid. Indeed, after quoting a second fragment from de 
Man’s personal correspondence, Derrida makes explicit the connection between the 
shibboleth and the purpose of  his speech in “Acts”: 
This was written in 1971 [the quoted correspondence] and I believe that we 
never again spoke of  it [the debate over Rousseau], at least in the mode of  
conversation, direct discussion, or even of  correspondence. And these silences 
belong to that vertiginous abyss of  the unsaid, above which is situated, I do 
not say is grounded, the memory of  a friendship, as the renewed ﬁ delity of  
a promise. This unsaid is not always what goes without saying, but it is also 
erased in the incessant movement of  a writing that remains to be deciphered. 
(DERRIDA, 1986a, p.131, emphasis added). 
I write above, “Derrida makes explicit” in reference to a passage that appears 
to be anything but an explicit critique. But how does one make explicit a “vertiginous 
abyss of  the unsaid,” or, rather, how does one present the unsayable? Precisely. The 
“vertiginous abyss” of  the “unsaid” is exactly the problem at hand. Thus, this study 
reads “Acts” in relation to a word, shibboleth, that “Acts” never utters. The shibboleth 
is never pronounced; it can never be pronounced. If, as de Man (1979, p.10) claims, 
“rhetoric radically suspends logic and opens up vertiginous possibilities of  referential 
aberration,” then no ﬁ gure no matter how wise or nimble can make reference to its 
own rhetoric. De Man’s shibboleth renders “the question as to whether the author 
himself  is or is not blinded […] to some extent irrelevant…” and also renders “the 
true question: whether [an author’s] language is or is not blind to its own statement” 
equally irrelevant and thoroughly unanswerable (DE MAN, 1983, p.137). 
Thus, de Man’s critique of  Derrida crumbles along with any attempt to conceive 
of  “deconstruction” as a community, or a community-to-come. Following de Man’s 
logic, there can be no shibboleth. No limit can be drawn. Any attempt at accounting, or 
distinguishing Gileadites from Ephraimites is radically suspended by the possibility 
of  referential aberration. We have no ﬁ rm basis for including Rousseau, de Man, 
Derrida, or anyone else for that matter within any community at all, whether or 
not it is a question of  deconstruction. “This,” the vague nucleus formed at Johns 
Hopkins in 1966, is an empty set. Two or three can never become one. Indeed 
one can never become one. As such, the “interrupted history” of  deconstruction 
Derrida presents in “Acts” is truly “interrupted,” and can have no history as a 
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discrete entity. In consequence, the community invoked by the title of  this study is 
unmasked. We can make an example of  it but it cannot be exemplary. It is merely a 
rhetorical community that belies the fundamental impossibility of  community. And 
one can only respond, watching Gileadites strike down Ephraimites in the passages 
of  literary history, “Forgive them, for they know not what they do”. 
Must the story of  the “future promise” of  deconstruction end here with 
the assertion that it never was and never shall be a community? Must we give up 
hope of  thinking through this aporia of  the shibboleth? In other words, does posing 
deconstruction as a question of  community merely show that all references to 
community overlook the ineluctable problem of  reference itself ? 
To wholeheartedly answer “yes” to these questions, and remain in the purgatorio 
of  referential aberration, would be to overlook Derrida’s most explicit statement of  
the “future promise” of  de Man’s thought. According to “Acts,” de Man’s greatest 
legacy and the concomitant future promise of  deconstruction is this: he shows us 
that the aporia is never the end of  the story. “The word ‘aporia,’” Derrida (1986a, 
p.135) explains, “[...] recurs often in Paul de Man’s last texts. I believe that we would 
misunderstand it if  we tried to hold it to its most literal meaning: an absence of  
path, a paralysis before roadblocks, the immobilization of  thinking, the impossibility 
of  advancing, a barrier blocking the future”. Rather, de Man demonstrates that 
“[...] the very oscillation of  undecidability goes back and forth and weaves a text; it 
makes, if  this is possible, a path of  writing through the aporia.” (DERRIDA, 1986a, 
p.135). The aporia may interrupt the story. But it does not end the story. Rather, it 
provokes a rethinking of  the nature and limits of  the problem at hand. It forces a 
“rethinking of  the path” that brought us to this seeming end-point (DERRIDA, 
1986a, p.132). Hence, Derrida’s “…interrupted – history” of  deconstruction pauses 
on the “Rhetoric of  Blindness” debate. But, it does not stop there. It is not clear that 
it ever stops at all.
At ﬁ rst glance, Derrida’s contribution to the “The Rhetoric of  Blindness” 
debate ‘begins’ on page 129 of  Mémoires and ‘ends’ on page 132 with a muted 
exhortation: “We should perhaps speak of  this again some other time.” However, 
this short digression in Derrida’s text links the question of  the shibboleth raised by the 
“Rhetoric of  Blindness” debate to the whole of  “Acts.” In fact, Derrida’s summation 
on page 131 hints that the enigma of  the shibboleth distills the secret and subtle 
quintessence of  a speech that purports to address “the enigma of  a secret and subtle 
Auseinandersetzung between Heidegger and Paul de Man” (DERRIDA, 1986a, p.92). 
Here, Derrida explicitly calls the boundaries of  the previously discussed debate into 
question: 
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For in a certain way, that of  which Paul de Man says ‘perhaps we can speak 
of  this again later’ [the disagreement over Rousseau] and of  which I have 
just said we never spoke again, in truth, is what we have never ceased writing 
about ever since, as if  to prepare ourselves to speak of  it again one day, in our 
very old age. All in all, a promise. (DERRIDA, 1986a, p.131).
The specter of  the shibboleth emerges, as we have seen in the analysis of  the 
“debate”, regardless of  whether we read “The Rhetoric of  Blindness” literally or 
rhetorically. Yet, the inexorable presence of  the shibboleth has tricked us into literalizing 
the problem. As this passage from Derrida suggests, the problem raised by the debate 
over Rousseau, what we have here called the problem of  the shibboleth, and not any 
particular shibboleth (e.g. the shibboleth of  rhetoric de Man seemingly hypostasizes), is 
what holds him and de Man together. The shibboleth (as question of  limits) lurks 
in the margins of  everything they have written. They are then, at the very least, a 
community of  two, united by no shibboleth but the problem of  the shibboleth itself. 
With this subversion of  boundaries in mind, we can begin to read the rest of  “Acts” 
with an eye towards “rethinking the path” that brought us to the point of  washing 
our hands of  “this” whole thing. 
Fittingly, Derrida (1986a, p.91) opens “Acts” by attempting to account for a 
past speech act: “I announced as you will perhaps remember, that I would speak 
of  memory”. However, this discussion of  memory quickly turns away from the 
question of  memory and towards the implications of  de Man’s appropriation of  a 
phrase from Heidegger. Derrida references a passage that appears in the “Promises” 
chapter of  de Man’s Allegories of  Reading: 
The redoubtable effi  cacy of  the text [the Social Contract] is due to the rhetorical 
model of  which it is a version. This model is a fact of  language over which 
Rousseau himself  has no control. Just as any other reader, he is bound to 
misread his text as a promise of  political change. The error is not within 
the reader; language itself  dissociates the cognition from the act. Die Sprache 
verspricht (sich); to the extent that is necessarily misleading [sic], language just 
as necessarily conveys the promise of  its own truth. This is also why textual 
allegories on this level of  rhetorical complexity generate history. (DE MAN, 
1979, p.277). 
De Man changes Heidegger’s famous one-liner Die Sprache spricht, “language 
speaks,” to a double-liner: “language contradicts itself ”/“language promises 
(itself).” One might well ask, echoing de Man’s appropriation of  Archie Bunker in 
“Semiology and Rhetoric”: What’s the diff erence? The diff erence, Derrida insists, 
is de Man’s main concern, greatest insight, and the key to the future possibility of  
deconstruction as a community.
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Heidegger’s phrase is a “[...] taking note of  the fact that language is not the 
governable instrument of  a speaking being (or subject) and that its essence cannot 
appear through any other instance than that of  the very language which names it, 
says it, gives it to be thought, speaks it.” Rather, “Language speaks of  and by itself ” 
(DERRIDA, 1986a, p.96-97). De Man, like Heidegger, rejects meta-linguistic 
totalization. As he says in “Semiology and Rhetoric,” “We end up therefore, in 
the case of  the rhetorical grammatization of  semiology, just as in the grammatical 
rhetorization of  illocutionary phrases, in the same state of  suspended ignorance.” 
(DE MAN, 1979, p.19). Yet, Heidegger’s phrase is insuffi  cient in de Man’s estimation 
insofar as it lends itself  to privileging semiology over rhetoric, a totalized, determinate 
system over the “vertiginous abyss” of  undecidability. As Derrida (1986a, p.97) puts 
it: “[…] the discreet parody which complicates spricht with verspricht suggests, on the 
contrary, that there is no originary and essential Sprechen which is then modalized into 
a promise.” The promise is not a mode of  language; it is the mode of  language itself.
Hence, de Man’s variation on Heidegger’s theme insists that language can only 
speak (itself) in a certain way. It must speak as if  it will lead to a fulﬁ llment that 
never comes. Language turns as if  towards truth or reference, but ﬁ nding only the 
ineluctable stasis of  “suspended ignorance,” it can only turn again: “[…] without any 
hope of  achieving the stability of  a metalanguage, a metatrope, a metarhetoric…” 
(DE MAN, 1983, p.215). Again, again, again, but each time promising to reach the 
truth, each time seeming to promise something other than itself. In the end, language 
can only give itself. It, thus, contradicts itself  in the act of  promising. “This,” Derrida 
(1986a, p.100) claims, “[...] is why Paul de Man writes: Die Sprache verspricht (sich)… 
He adds the pronoun as that which speech must add to itself  in order to speak.” 
Language, de Man shows us, is but this promise that is also a contradiction. Or, 
as Derrida (1986a, p.95) puts it, “[...] the act of  language is that of  a performative 
promise whose perverse ambiguity cannot be dominated or puriﬁ ed, but whose very 
act could not be annulled.” De Man’s greatest insight, and the hope for the future 
community “deconstruction in America” is this: all language follows the logic of  an 
contradictory promise. 
“Acts” thus forces us to reevaluate, and attempt to answer on de Man’s own 
terms (“leaving him a chance to speak”) the questions that previously brought us to 
the point of  trashing his critique of  Derrida:
Q: Can the present text, or any other, make a reﬂ exive gesture towards its own irony 
or rhetoricity? 
A: Yes, but only as a gesture, never touching upon something that will take us beyond 
the reﬂ exivity of  the gesture. 
Q: Can a text fail to be self-reﬂ exive?
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A: A text is nothing but its own self-reﬂ exive promise. 
Q: Can rhetoric account for rhetoric?
A: Only rhetoric can account for rhetoric.
But, where does this catechism leave us? It forces us into a self-reﬂ exive 
gesture. It sends us back to one of  the ﬁ rst passages cited above. Having situated de 
Man’s legacy as a question of  the promise, we now see Derrida’s treatment of  “The 
Rhetoric of  Blindness” debate in “Acts” for what it truly is: a veiled (re)assertion of  
the “agreement” that de Man rejected in the letter of  July 9, 1970. By blurring the 
boundaries between the “Rhetoric of  Blindness” debate and everything else that he 
and de Man have ever written, Derrida makes clear that the problem of  the shibboleth 
is the exact double of  the promise. The logic of  the shibboleth, “what we have never 
ceased writing about” (DERRIDA, 1986a, p.132), is the logic of  the promise. For the 
shibboleth, like all language, promises. It promises substance, something other than 
itself, belongingness. It can only speak as such. It must speak as such. In the end, 
however, the shibboleth promises nothing but itself. It contradicts itself. To hear or not 
to hear the voice of  the other as a voice of  contradiction, the voice of  a “sparring 
partner”… that is the question. But language itself  is the site where this choice must 
be made: Are we legion or are we one? Thus, the ability to maintain a shared history 
(a friendship even) in the wake of  the “most uncanny, most insane, most bizarrely 
interesting critical encounter imaginable” reinscribes the possibility for a community 
that does not depend on essential commonality, or a shibboleth referring to substantive 
diff erence from others. Derrida and de Man can at once agree and disagree, and two 
can (again) become one.
As such, when coupled with de Man’s notion of  language-as-promise, the 
question of  the shibboleth returns us to literal meaning. Its literal meaning. The word 
shibboleth such as the Gileadites used it meant “a stream or torrent.” “Acts” shows 
us that de Man’s greatest insight is the recognition that language tosses us into an 
unbreakable torrent. In this stream we are not sure who is who, what is what, whether 
I am even I. The only hope for community – which is also the possibility for the 
violence enacted by community – is an event, an interruption in the uninterruptible 
torrent. De Man, following Rousseau, shows us that this emergence must always 
take the form of  a foundational story or “interrupted history.” The torrent is never 
broken. The sea is never parted. But it can seem to break or seem to part, for language 
promises as much as it withholds. 
Community is thus recast as solidarity despite absolute diff erence. Community, 
de Man shows us, emerges as a rhetorical one in the space of  literal multiplicity. 
Or, put otherwise, community is the literal reading of  an ineluctably rhetorical 
promise. De Man’s legacy gestures us towards Giorgio Agamben’s utopian “coming 
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community” (communita che viene) composed of  “[...] whatever singularity, which 
wants to appropriate belonging itself, its own being-in-language, and thus rejects all 
identity and every condition of  belonging […]” (AGAMBEN, 1993, p.86)11. Unlike 
Agamben, however, de Man’s gesture does not imply a redemptive telos. As long as 
there is hope for community there is hope for those who disregard de Man’s warning 
that “…it is substance itself  that is the abyss.” (DE MAN, 1983, p. 245). 
As such, the future of  deconstruction as a community emerges from the 
passages of  “Acts” tempered but unscathed. The problem of  the shibboleth may 
indeed be situated above a “vertiginous abyss of  the unsaid.” But, this “vertiginous 
abyss of  the unsaid” is certainly “not always what goes without saying” (DERRIDA, 
1986a, p.131). For the sorrowful landscape of  history is littered with the forgotten 
bodies of  Gileadites and Ephraimites by a thousand other names. “The promise,” 
Derrida (1986a, p.150) warns, “[...] has meaning and gravity only on the condition of  
death…only with the death of  the other,” only on the occasion of  mourning. It is 
all-too-easy, all-too-human, to forget de Man’s greatest insight: language-as-promise-
as-shibboleth. We are accustomed to living within the arbitrary conditions imposed 
upon the torrent, and hardly ever remember to ask, as we are tossed around by its 
waters, “What are we, who are we, to what and to whom are we, and to what and to 
whom are we destined in the experience of  this impossible promise?” (DERRIDA, 
1986a, p.149, emphases in text). 
Accordingly, “Acts” casts “deconstruction” as the impossible community, a 
community whose shibboleth is a vow to endeavor to say the unsayable and ask the 
unaskable. “Deconstruction,” Derrida assures us, will go on as long as there are 
those who attempt to state, as de Man (1983, p.133) ironically states in “The Rhetoric 
of  Blindness,” that, “The only literal statement that says what it means to say is 
the assertion that there can be no literal statements”. “Deconstruction in America” 
will go on, perhaps under a thousand diff erent monikers, as long as there are those 
who attempt to ask “For what is the use of  asking, I ask, when we cannot even 
authoritatively decide whether a question asks or doesn’t ask?” (DE MAN, 1979, 
p.10). And, if  the author of  the present study may be excused his own petit profession 
de soi, deconstruction will go on, indeed must go on, as long as there are Gileadites 
among us who believe that there is substance worthy of  death behind any mark, 
sign, or letter. Which is not to say that “deconstruction” off ers a vision of  hope or 
11 Agamben’s quote ends with the assertion that this “whatever singularity…is the principle enemy of the 
state.” I withhold it above, precisely because the duality of the de Manian promise (of language) insists 
upon the diffi culty of at once maintaining Agamben’s revolutionary “co-belonging” of singularities and 
resisting a nostalgic return to a literalized “representable condition of belonging.” In other words, the “co-
belonging” of singularity is all-too-easily reinscribed as exclusive and divisive unity. De Man shows that 
this occurs not by virtue of the “bad faith” of the singularities involved, but by virtue of our ineluctable 
“being-in-language,” our existence in the torrent/shibboleth. 
226 Rev. Let., São Paulo, v.49, n.2, p.207-227, jul./dez. 2009.
progress. Derrida – de Man – Rousseau, these three, this one, leave to us all that can 
ever be left, that is, a promise: “The love that moves the sun and the other stars.” 
[l’amor che move il sole e l’altre stelle, Dante’s Paradiso, Canto 33, line 145). 
SPOSITO, S. Lendo o Shibboleth: Derrida – de Man – Rousseau. Revista de Letras, 
São Paulo, v. 49, n.2, p.207-227, jul./dez., 2009
RESUMO ▪ : Este artigo empreende uma leitura original de Acts, de Jacques Derrida, um 
memorial para Paul de Man que tenta responder à questão “Qual é o legado da desconstrução?” 
sob a perspectiva que entende a desconstrução como uma comunidade determinada, logo 
também como referência às repercussões da desconstrução para nossa compreensão dos limites 
da comunidade (o problema do shibboleth). Ao focalizar a interrupção que, em Acts, diz 
respeito ao debate travado em Rhetoric of  Blindness entre Derrida e De Man, sobre se 
Rousseau deve ou não ser lido como um membro da comunidade da desconstrução avant la 
lettre, o presente artigo argumenta contrariamente a interpretações anteriores do debate que 
o entendiam nos termos de um simples antagonismo. Como Derrida deixa claro em Acts, o 
debate sobre se Rousseau expressa ou não um tipo de shibboleth e se qualquer texto ou ato de 
fala pode ou não oferecer shibboleth no que diz respeito ao uso autoconsciente de uma linguagem 
sempre já indeterminada, destila o problema dos limites da comunidade e das condições de 
possibilidade da comunidade, uma questão que deve ser necessariamente pensada em meio a 
qualquer discussão do legado da desconstrução.
PALAVRAS CHAVE ▪ : Desconstrução. Comunidade. Shibboleth. Rousseau. Retórica. 
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